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UNITED STATES V. GAYLE
(decided August 27, 2003)
CHRISTINE AUBIN*
Under federal law, a defendant found illegally in possession of
a firearm, who has a prior felony conviction "in any court", may be
charged as a felon-in-possession in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g) (1).1 The purpose of this statute is to protect the public
against gun possession by convicted felons. In United States v.
Gayle,2 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that
the defendant's prior Canadian conviction did not constitute a
predicate offense under the statute because the conviction did not
occur in a United States court. The authorities are split when de-
termining whether a prior foreign conviction can serve as a predi-
cate offense under 18 U.S.C. § 9 22(g) (1). The third, fourth and
sixth circuits have allowed convictions in any court to qualify as a
predicate offense, 3 whereas, the second and tenth circuits have re-
fused to adopt this broad reading of the statute. 4 In United States v.
Gayle,5 the court held that the plain text, statutory scheme, and leg-
* J.D. candidate New York Law School, 2005.
1. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2003).
2. 342 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2003).
3. See United States v. Small, 333 F.3d 425 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that a Japa-
nese conviction could serve as a predicate offense under 18 U.S.C. § 9 22(g) (1)); United
States v. Atkins, 872 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that the defendant's conviction in
England could serve as a predicate offense because the term "any" was unambiguous
and all-encompassing); United States v. Winson, 793 F.2d 754 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding
that the defendant's Argentinean and Swiss convictions could serve as a predicate
offense).
4. See United States v. Gayle, 342 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that the defen-
dant's Canadian conviction could not serve as a predicate offense under 18 U.S.C.
§ 9 22(g) (1) because the Senate Report and the Conference Report show Congress's
intent to exclude foreign convictions); United States v. Concha, 233 F.3d 1249 (10th
Cir. 2000) (holding that the defendant's United Kingdom convictions could not serve
as predicate offenses because the strong arguments for both allowing or not allowing a
foreign conviction to serve as a predicate offense required the court to apply the rule of
lenity. The rule of lenity states that when Congress's intent is unclear, a court may not
interpret a federal criminal statute in a manner that would increase the penalty placed
on the individual).
5. Gayle, 342 F.3d 89.
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islative history of 18 U.S.C. § 9 22(g) (1) evidenced Congress's intent
to exclude foreign convictions from this statute. However, the
court made these conclusions based on a logically flawed analysis,
which in turn led to an erroneous reversal. In order to apply the
law more equitably, and to address the concerns raised by the vari-
ous circuits, this comment proposes a two-prong test that would al-
low a fairer and more consistent result.
On February 16, 2001, authorities arrested Rohan Ingram in a
New York hotel because they suspected he illegally entered the
United States. 6 In his hotel room, the authorities found a large
number of firearms. 7 Previously, Ingram had been convicted in a
Canadian court for violating the Canadian Criminal Code by using
a firearm during the commission of an indictable offense.8 As a
result of Ingram's previous conviction, he was presently arrested
and charged with, inter alia,9 being a felon-in-possession of a fire-
arm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 9 22(g) (1).
Under 18 U.S.C. § 9 22(g)(1), it is unlawful for any person,
"who has been convicted in any court, of a crime punishable by im-
prisonment for a term exceeding one year;... to ship or transport
in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting com-
merce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or
ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or
foreign commerce."' 0 At the district court level, the defense moved
to dismiss the felon-in-possession count, claiming Ingram's prior
6. Gayle, 342 F.3d at 90.
7. Id.
8. Id.; Canadian Criminal Code, R.S.C. ch. C-46, § 85 (1985) (Can.). The Cana-
dian Criminal Code provides in relevant part that, "(1) Every person commits an of-
fence who uses a firearm (a) while committing an indictable offence, other than an
offence under section 220 (criminal negligence causing death), 236 (manslaughter),
239 (attempted murder), 244 (causing bodily harm with intent - firearm), 272 (sexual
assault with a weapon) or 273 (aggravated sexual assault), subsection 279 (1) (kidnap-
ping) or section 279.1 (hostage-taking), 344 (robbery) or 346 (extortion), (b) while
attempting to commit an indictable offence, or (c) during flight after committing or
attempting to commit an indictable offence, whether or not the person causes or means
to cause bodily harm to any person as a result of using the firearm.
9. Gayle, 342 F.3d at 90. Ingram was also charged with conspiracy to export de-
fense articles designated on the United States Munitions List in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 371, 22 U.S.C. § 2778 and conspiracy to travel with intent to engage in the illegal
acquisition of firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a) (1) (A) and 18 U.S.C. § 924(n).
10. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2003).
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Canadian conviction did not fall within the definition of the stat-
ute. a' After hearing arguments from both the defense and the gov-
ernment, the district court denied Ingram's motion.' 2 The district
court held that § 9 22(g) (1) includes foreign convictions and there-
fore, Ingram's conviction served as a suitable predicate offense.
13
On October 5, 2001, Ingram was found guilty on all counts.
14
He made a motion to set aside the verdict, which was denied on
February 5, 2002.15 On January 30, 2002, the court sentenced In-
gram to 78 months imprisonment followed by a three year term of
supervised release, and a $300 fine.16 Thereafter, Ingram appealed
to the second circuit on the grounds that his foreign Canadian con-
viction should not constitute a predicate offense under 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g) (1).
17
On appeal, the second circuit addressed the only issue before
the court, whether Ingram's conviction in a Canadian court satis-
fied the statutory element that requires a conviction "in any
court."' The court held that Congress did not intend the statute to
apply when the prior conviction occurred in a foreign court.' 9 To
reach this conclusion, the court analyzed the plain text of the stat-
ute, the statutory scheme, and its legislative history.
The court stated that "[s] tatutory construction begins with the
plain text and, if that text is unambiguous" the court need not look
any further to determine the statute's meaning.2 0 The majority of
courts, including the third, fourth and sixth circuits, have held that
the term "in any court" is unambiguously broad and all encompass-
ing.2 1 However, the second circuit concluded that the ambiguity in
the terms required a more-thorough examination,2 2 because the
11. Gay/e, 342 F.3d at 91.
12. Id.







19. Id. at 95.
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statutory language could not be construed as completely "unambig-
uous" on its face. 23
The court addressed the plain text meaning by looking at the
statutory scheme. 24 Under 18 U.S.C. § 921, Congress generally de-
fines the types of crimes that can constitute a predicate offense for
a § 9 22(g) (1) conviction. 25 The court reasoned that Congress did
not intend to include foreign convictions because they purposely
did not include foreign courts in the definition of a predicate of-
fense under § 921.26 The court relied on the Tenth Circuit's rea-
soning and acknowledged the tension between the application of
the statute to foreign and domestic crimes.27
In order to resolve this tension, the court closely examined the
statute's legislative history for clues into Congress's intent. The
court began this analysis by looking at the SenateJudiciary Commit-
tee Report on the Gun Control Act as well as the Conference
Report.
2 8
According to the court, the Senate Judiciary Committee Re-
port "strongly" suggested that Congress did not intend to include
foreign convictions because when the Senate explained the mean-
ing of the word "felony," it only included federal and state court
convictions. 29 The court stated, "the Senate Report thus unmistaka-
bly contemplated felonies, for purposes of the Gun Control Act, to
include only convictions in federal and state courts."30 Addition-
ally, the court analyzed the Conference Report.3 ' The court stated
23. Id.
24. Id. at 93.
25. 18 U.S.C. § 921 (2003) (The term "crime punishable by imprisonment for a
term exceeding one year" does not include: (A) any federal or state offenses pertaining
to antitrust violations, unfair trade practices, restraints of trade, or other similar of-
fenses relating to the regulation of business practices, or (B) any state offense classified
by the laws of the state as a misdemeanor and punishable by a term of imprisonment of
two years or less).
26. Gayle, 342 F.3d at 93.
27. Id. "If 'in any court' were to include foreign courts, we would be left with the
anomalous situation that fewer domestic crimes would be covered than would be for-
eign crimes." See also United States v. Concha, 233 F.3d 1249, 1254 (10th Cir. 2000).
28. See Gayle, 342 F.3d at 94; S. Rep. No. 90-1501 (1968); H.R. Conf. Rep. 90-1956,
1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4426 (1968).
29. Id.
30. Id. (emphasis added).
31. Gayle, 342 F.3d at 95.
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that the Conference Report "voiced no disagreement"32 with the
Senate Report's analysis of the terms to be included in the statute.
The court held that by choosing the phrase "a crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" instead of "felony,"
the Conference Report accepted the Senate Report's limitation of
the statute to domestic convictions only. Therefore, Congress
never intended to include foreign convictions within the meaning
of the statute.
33
Lasdy, the court balanced the possibility that Congress may
have intended to include foreign convictions in the definition of
the statute with due process concerns.3 4 The court noted that Con-
gress probably meant to prohibit people previously convicted of
committing violent crimes from possessing firearms, regardless of
where that crime occurred.35 On the other hand, the court recog-
nized that Congress might be concerned about the inequitable ap-
plication of the law between foreign and domestic courts and the
need to protect a person's First Amendment rights because in other
countries, the failure to follow a certain religion or to criticize the
government may constitute felonies. 36 The court concluded that
these concerns should be left for Congress to decide and refused to
interpret the statute in a manner that appeared inconsistent with
Congress's intent.
37
Accordingly, the court reversed Ingram's conviction with re-
gard to the felon-in-possession charge and remanded it for resen-
tencing on the remaining counts. 3 1 Although the court thoroughly
analyzed the statute's plain meaning, statutory scheme and legisla-
tive history, its analysis was inherently flawed and completely cir-
cumvents the purpose of the statute. If adopted, this analysis will
lead to arbitrary results.
The Second Circuit's analysis was flawed for a number of rea-






37. Id. at 96.
38. Id.
2004]
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general definition section.39 This section states, "the term 'a crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year' does not
include (A) any Federal or State offenses ...-40 The court then
jumped to the conclusion that since Congress explicitly excluded
certain types of federal and state offenses, 41 they did not mean to
include foreign offenses. This conclusion does not logically follow
from the court's reasoning. From this assertion, one could logically
argue that since Congress explicitly excluded certain types of fed-
eral and state offenses, they necessarily meant to include foreign of-
fenses. Had Congress wished to exclude foreign offenses, it could
very well have had listed them in this section of excluded
convictions.
Second, the court in Gayle incorrectly relied on the Tenth Cir-
cuit's decision in United States v. Concha.42 The main issue to be
resolved in Concha concerned the application of the sentence en-
hancement provision of the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA")
to foreign convictions.43 Under the ACCA, a person in possession
of a firearm who has three or more prior convictions for violent
felonies or serious drug offenses must be imprisoned for at least
fifteen years.44 The ACCA refers specifically to § 9 22(g) (1), 4 5
therefore, whether foreign convictions are included under the
ACCA still needed to be determined. In Concha, the court con-
cluded that the statute was ambiguous and that there was a textual
argument supporting both the inclusion and exclusion of foreign
convictions. 46 As a result of this ambivalence, the court applied the
rule of lenity, stating that "in such a situation, we are guided by the
rule of lenity, that we 'will not interpret a federal criminal statute so
39. Id. at 93.
40. 18 U.S.C. § 921 (2003).
41. Id. The statute excludes, inter alia, antitrust violations, restraints of trade and
other offenses relating to business practices.
42. 233 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 2000).
43. 18 U.S.C. § 924 (2003).
44. Id. The defendant in Concha had four prior felony convictions, three of which
occurred in the United Kingdom.
45. 18 U.S.C. § 924 (e) (1) states that the enhancement applies to "three previous
convictions by any court referred to in section 922(g)(1) of this title."
46. Concha, 233 F.3d at 1256.
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as to increase the penalty that it places on an individual.' "47 The
Gayle court similarly concluded that the statute was ambiguous, and
yet rather than apply the rule of lenity, sought to interpret Con-
gress's intent by examining the legislative history. After assessing
two portions of the legislative history, the Gayle court concluded
"that Congress did not intend foreign convictions to serve as a pred-
icate offense for § 9 22(g) (1).
' '48
Lastly, the Second Circuit analyzed the legislative history of the
statute. The court relied on the Senate report's definition of the
term felony.49 However, the Second Circuit failed to recognize that
when the statute was enacted, the House bill was passed in lieu of
the Senate bill,50 and Congress relied on the definition of felony set
out in the House bill.51 The court recognized that the Senate Re-
port's definition of felony was limited to federal and state convic-
tions, and concluded that since the House bill did not specifically
denounce this limitation, Congress never meant to include foreign
convictions.52 However, the court admitted that Congress may have
intended to incorporate "certain types" of foreign convictions be-
cause the legislation represents Congress's concern with firearm
possession by convicted felons. 53 Congress intended to prevent ex-
actly the type of situation that occurred in Gayle when they enacted
§ 9 22(g) (1).
The tension created between Congress's intent and the ambi-
guity in the statute has led to the current split of authority on this
47. Concha, 233 F.3d at 1256 (citing to United States v. Diaz, 989 F.2d 391, 393
(10th Cir. 1993)).
48. Gayle, 342 F.3d at 95. The court attributed its determination that Congress did
not intend foreign convictions to constitute predicate offenses under the statute to cer-
tain "illuminating" House and Senate reports. Id. at 95 n.6.
49. See Gayle, 342 F.3d at 94; S. Rep. No. 90-1501, at 31 (1968) (a felony is a "fed-
eral crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year and in the case of
State law, an offense determined by the laws of the State to be a felony.").
50. Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4410 (1968).
51. H.R. Conf. Rep 90-1956, 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4426, 4428 (1968) (stating:
A difference between the House bill and the Senate amendment which re-
curs in the provisions described above is that the crime referred to in the
House bill is one punishable by imprisonment for more than one year and
the crime referred to in the Senate amendment is a crime of violence pun-
ishable as a felony ... The conference substitute adopts the crime referred
to in the House bill).
52. Gayle, 342 F.3d at 95.
53. See Gayle, 342 F.3d at 95; S. Rep. No. 90-1501, at 22 (1968).
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issue. Presently, the majority of courts have held that the language
in § 9 22 (g) (1) is clearly unambiguous and therefore, encompasses
all convictions in any court including foreign convictions.5 4 How-
ever, the minority viewpoint can just as strongly argue that Congress
never intended to include foreign convictions because of the obvi-
ous inconsistencies that arise when applying the statute to domestic
or foreign convictions. 55 For these reasons, the court should adopt
a new test when addressing whether a foreign conviction should be
allowed to serve as a predicate offense under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1).
Instead of focusing on the statutory language of § 9 22(g) (1),
the courts should adopt a case-by-case analysis using a two-prong
test. The first prong analyzes the nature of the offense: Would the
offense be considered a felony under the laws of the United States?
The second prong analyzes the justice system of the court of the
previous conviction: Does this nation/country adhere to similar
due process standards and requirements as the United States? By
adopting this type of approach, the courts could uphold Congress's
intent to prevent persons convicted of dangerous felonies from pos-
sessing firearms, as well as set a standard that would avoid the ineq-
uitable application of the law which occurs today.
56
First, the courts should focus on the nature of the offense.
57
For example, if the previous crime committed constituted an aggra-
vated assault under the United States criminal justice system, the
court would assess whether that crime should fall within the statute.
They should examine the type of crime, whether the defendant
54. Gayle, 342 F.3d at 92.
55. See generally Tracey A. Basler, Note, Does "Any" Mean "All" or Does "Any" Mean
"Some"? An Analysis of the "Any Court" Ambiguity of the Armed Career Criminal Act and
Whether Foreign Convictions Count as Predicate Convictions, 37 NEw ENG. L. REv. 147
(2002), for an in-depth analysis of the current split between the majority and minority
viewpoints as well as the legal issues and policy concerns about inferring Congressional
intent with regard to foreign convictions under the Armed Career Criminal Act and 18
U.S.C. § 922(g) (1).
56. See generally Joan E. Lisante, Felon Gets Second Chance On Gun Sentence, 2 No. 36
A.B.A. J. E-Report 3, 1 (2003) (recognizing the split of authority between the circuits;
the 3rd, 4th, 6th and 7th circuits have allowed foreign convictions as a predicate offense
under the felon-in-possession statute, whereas the 2nd and 10th have denied the use of
foreign convictions).
57. See generally Concha, 233 F.3d at 1253-4 (explaining how certain foreign felo-
nies should not constitute predicate offenses under § 922(g) (1) because they would
have been excluded if the conviction had been obtained in a United States court).
[Vol. 48
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used a firearm during the commission of the crime, and to what
extent that crime would be punishable under the United States sys-
tem. By looking at the nature of the offense, the courts would avoid
including foreign convictions which otherwise would not fall within
the statute. 58 If the court determined that this type of offense
would be punishable as a felony under the United States criminal
justice system, then it would move to the second prong of the test.
The second prong of the test would require the court to look
into the basis of the previous conviction. To determine the validity
of the conviction, the court should assess where the previous con-
viction occurred, the type ofjudicial system in use, and the stability
and reliability of the conviction.
First, the court should assess where the previous conviction oc-
curred and the type of judicial system utilized by that country. For
example, if the conviction occurred in an English court, an Ameri-
can court would be more likely to hold that a foreign conviction
qualifies as a predicate offense because the United States derived its
judicial system from English law. 59 By allowing the court to assess
the jurisdiction and type of judicial system where the previous con-
viction occurred, the due process concerns expressed in Gayle6°
would be immaterial because this would allow the court to deter-
mine whether the "procedures and methods" used by that system
"conform to minimum standards of justice."61
The court should also assess the stability and reliability of the
conviction. This aspect closely relates to assessing the judicial sys-
tem where the previous conviction occurred. In United States v.
Small,62 the court adopted the approach of the Restatement (3d) of
58. See Concha, 233 F.3d at 1253.
59. See United States v. Atkins, 872 F.2d 94, 96 (4th Cir. 1989) (stating
Atkins suffered the misfortune of violating foreign law in England, the
country which provides the origin or antecedent of the jurisdictional system
employed in the United States of America. We here deal with a system of
common law and statutes refining it, which obtains in England and
America alike. Accordingly, we find that Atkins' English conviction was a
proper predicate for conviction under § 922)
60. Gaye, 342 F.3d at 95 (stating that "had Congress contemplated extending the
prohibition to persons having foreign convictions, it would in all likelihood have been
troubled by the question whether the prohibition should apply to those convictions by
procedures and methods that did not conform to minimum standards of justice").
61. Gayle, 342 F.3d at 95.
62. 333 F.3d 425 (3d Cir. 2003).
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Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 482(1), which pro-
vides in part that "a court may not recognize ajudgment of a foreign
state if (a) the judgment was rendered under a judicial system that
does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with
due process of law."63 By adopting this approach, the court could
accurately assess the due process concerns as well as make an edu-
cated decision as to whether the conviction should serve as a predi-
cate offense under the statute. This would allow the court more
discretion when analyzing whether the foreign conviction's tribunal
comports with our notions of justice or to protect the convicted
person's First Amendment rights.
64
Furthermore, under this two-prong approach, a court could ef-
fectively determine whether a foreign conviction should serve as a
predicate offense under § 9 22(g) (1), as well as hold true to Con-
gress's purpose in enacting this statute-protecting citizens from
the danger imposed by allowing convicted felons to possess fire-
arms. For example, the Tenth Circuit recognized the impropriety
63. Small, 333 F.3d at 428. Section 482 states:
(1) A court in the United States may not recognize ajudgment of the court
of a foreign state if:
(a) the judgment was rendered under a judicial system that does not
provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with due process
of law; or
(b) the court that rendered the judgment did not have jurisdiction
over the defendant in accordance with the law of the rendering state
and with the rules set for in § 421;
(2) A court in the United States need not recognize a judgment of the
court of a foreign state if:
(a) the court that rendered the judgment did not have jurisdiction of
the subject matter of the action;
(b) the defendant did not receive notice of the proceedings in suffi-
cient time to enable him to defend;
(c) the judgment was obtained by fraud;
(d) the cause of action on which the judgment was based, or the judg-
ment itself, is repugnant to the public policy of the United States or of
the State where recognition is sought;
(e) the judgment conflicts with another finaljudgment that is entitled
to recognition; or
(f) the proceeding in the foreign court was contrary to an agreement
between the parties to submit the controversy on which the judgment
is based to another forum.
Id. (citing Restatement (3d) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 482).
64. Gayle, 342 F.3d at 95.
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of the application of § 9 22(g) (1) to foreign convictions in the area
of antitrust or business practice. 65 The Tenth Circuit stated:
If § 922(g) (1) were meant to cover foreign crimes, we
would be left with the anomalous situation that fewer do-
mestic crimes would be covered than would be foreign
crimes... someone who had been convicted of a U.S. an-
titrust violation would be allowed to possess a firearm,
while someone convicted of a British antitrust violation
would not be allowed to possess a firearm. 66
By applying this case to the two-prong test, the British antitrust
violation would not constitute a predicate offense under
§ 922(g) (1). Although the British conviction meets the require-
ments of the second prong, it does not meet the requirements of
the first prong since it would not be considered to fall within this
statute had the defendant been convicted in the United States.
Therefore, this test prevents the "anomalous" results feared in
Concha.
In conclusion, if the court had applied this two-prong test, In-
gram's conviction would have been upheld. The nature of the pre-
vious conviction would satisfy the first prong, and the Canadian
court system would satisfy the second prong. Therefore, the court
could have fairly concluded that Ingram's prior conviction consti-
tuted a predicate offense and upheld Congress's intent to protect
our citizens from the "danger[s] posed by firearms in the hands of
convicted felons," regardless of where that conviction occurred. 67
65. Concha, 233 F.3d at 1254.
66. Id.
67. Gay/e, 342 F.3d at 95 (citing to Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 218
(1976), S. Rep. No. 90-1501, at 22 (1968), S. Rep. No. 90-1097, at 19 (1968)).
2004]

